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THE EVOLUTION OF PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY
GAMING PRACTICES
Chelsea E. Ott*
I. INTRODUCTION
Brand name drug manufacturers invest approximately $2.6
billion and a decade’s worth of time bringing a drug to market.1
Generic drug manufacturers are able to enter the market quickly after
a brand name drug’s patent expires without costly clinical research
trials. After generic competitors enter the market, brand name drugs
usually lose upwards of ninety percent of their market share.2 Brand
name companies are upset with generic manufacturers’ ability to “freeride” on their investment in research and development (R&D) and
marketing. Generics claim that they are primarily able to offer lower
priced products because they do not have to market their drugs or
details to physicians in order to get their product into the hands of
patients.3
Both brand and generic drug manufacturers serve important
roles in treating and curing diseases. They are also extremely
profitable. Nonetheless, in an effort to continue profiting from their
initial investment, brand name manufacturers have engaged in
questionable practices, such as pay-for-delay settlements and product
hopping. Federal courts have reviewed such practices using nuanced
antitrust frameworks and arrived at differing conclusions. Generics,
meanwhile, have traditionally been protected by the federal and state
government because they help to limit health care costs, but in recent
* J.D. Candidate, 2017, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. University of
Pennsylvania. Thank you to my family, especially my parents, for their unwavering
support and confidence in my work. Many thanks to my advisor, Professor Jordan
Paradise, for her thoughtful comments.
1
PhRMA, 2015 PROFILE: BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH INDUSTRY (2015),
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015_phrma_profile.pdf.
2
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-tradecommission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
3
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50026, at *36 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (internal citations omitted).
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years it is unclear if all generics are as well-intentioned as they have
been portrayed. It is unclear what steps government agencies can take
at this time without being given additional powers from Congress.
Part II provides a primer of the drug approval processes of both
brand name and generic drugs. It examines the unique quality of the
pharmaceutical market, explains the current patent system, and lays
the foundation for understanding relevant antitrust law. Part III delves
into how federal agencies are involved in regulating anticompetitive
practices that have the potential to harm patients, specifically pay-fordelay settlements and product hopping. Part IV explores three recent
product hopping cases and explains how they reached differing
results. Lastly, Part V concludes.
II. A PRIMER ON THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE REGARDING DRUG APPROVAL
A. The Drug Approval Process, Patents, and the Hatch-Waxman Act
Drug patents, while similar to U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) market exclusivity rights, are distinct.4 Drug patents are
property rights approved by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO).5 Patents allow their holders “to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout
the United States or importing the invention into the United States”
for twenty years in exchange for public disclosure when the patent is
granted.6 Patents may be granted at any point in the course of drug
development and drugs are eligible to receive more than one patent if
they meet appropriate criteria.7 Patents expire twenty years from the
date of filing.8 Patents and exclusivity may run concurrently, but it is
not a requirement that they do so.9
Brand name drugs are those that initially seek approval from the
FDA using a New Drug Application (NDA). FDA approval is required
before a drug may be introduced into interstate commerce.10 A
company that has submitted a NDA will “undergo a long,
comprehensive, and costly testing process, after which, if successful,
4

Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FDA (July 18, 2014),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ucm079031.htm#Whatist
hedifferencebetweenpatentsandexclusivity?.
5
How Can I Better Understand Patents and Exclusivity?, U.S. FDA (Jan. 16, 2015),
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/FDABasicsforIndustry/ucm238582.htm.
6
35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2006).
7
U.S. FDA, supra note 5.
8
U.S. FDA, supra note 4.
9
Id.
10
21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006).
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the manufacturer will receive marketing approval.”11 In addition to
marketing approval, the FDA will confer market exclusivity upon a
drug that receives NDA approval.12 This protection can prevent the
approval or market entrance of certain 505(b)(2) applications,13 as well
as abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs) for prescribed periods
of time.14 The duration of the exclusivity varies by type of drug.15
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of
1984, more commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, has had two
important effects on the pharmaceutical industry. First, generic drug
manufacturers are permitted to use the streamlined ANDA process.16
Second, the first generic ANDA paragraph IV certification filer is
eligible for 180 days of marketing exclusivity.17
“A generic drug product is one that is comparable to an innovator
drug product in dosage form, strength, route of administration,
quality, performance characteristics and intended use.”18 Congress
enacted the Hatch-Waxman Act to enable generic drug companies to
introduce their cheaper products into the market quicker.19 Prior to
the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, over one hundred branded drugs were
without generic counterparts despite the fact that their patents had
already expired.20 At that time, generics comprised only nineteen
11

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013). See also 21 U.S.C. §355(b)(1)
(2006).
12
U.S. FDA, supra note 4. See also 21 C.F.R. § 211.1 (2016); 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(F)(ii) (2006).
13
§ 355(b)(2). 505(b)(2) applications rely on at least one investigation “not
conducted by or for the applicant and for which the applicant has not obtained a right
of reference or use from the person by or for whom the investigations were
conducted.” Id.
14
Small Business Assistance: Frequently Asked Questions for New Drug Product Exclusivity,
U.S. FDA (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess
/SmallBusinessAssistance/ucm069962.htm.
15
U.S. FDA, supra note 4.
16
M. Sean Royall et al., Antitrust Scrutiny of Pharmaceutical “Product Hopping”, 28
ANTITRUST 71, 72 (Fall 2013).
17
Small Business Assistance: 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, U.S. FDA (Feb. 11,
2016), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusiness
Assistance/ucm069964.htm.
18
Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA): Generics, U.S. FDA (Nov. 16, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopeda
ndApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGeneric
s/default.htm.
19
Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need
a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era?, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 293, 297
(2015).
20
Id. at 300. See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999).
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percent of prescriptions,21 whereas now generic scripts account for
nearly eighty percent of prescriptions in the United States.22 In 2016,
brand name sales accounted for $244 billion and generic sales
amounted to $70 billion in the United States.23 The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that generic drugs reduce costs at retail
pharmacies by $8 billion to $10 billion a year.24
When lobbying for its passage, advocates of Hatch-Waxman
championed it “as the best possible compromise between two
competing economic interests,” namely a push to develop new
groundbreaking drugs by brand name manufacturers and a
mechanism to get these life-saving drugs to patients in a quick and costeffective manner.25 The Act allows cheaper generics to enter the
market faster by shortening the ANDA approval process; importantly,
clinical trials, which are incredibly expensive and time-consuming, are
not required since the generics demonstrate their bioequivalence in
their applications.26 To be a bioequivalent means that a drug has
the same active ingredients, is “of the same pharmacological or
therapeutic class . . . and can be expected to have the same therapeutic
effect.”27 The generic must also have the same labeling as the listed
drug.28 The generic must not seek approval for a use that has not
already been approved for the listed drug.29 Additionally, generics
must also meet Current Good Manufacturing Practices (CGMP).30
Lastly, there must be a patent certification indicating one of the
following: (I) the patent information for the listed drug has not been
filed; (II) that the patent expired; (III) the particular date the patent
is set to expire; or (IV) the patent is invalid or will not be infringed

21

Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 19, at 300. See Mossinghoff, supra note 20, at

187.
22

Facts about Generic Drugs, U.S. FDA (June 19, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/drugs/
resourcesforyou/consumers/buyingusingmedicinesafely/understandinggenericdrug
s/ucm167991.htm.
23
2016 Top Markets Report Pharmaceuticals, DEP’T. OF COM., INT’L TRADE ADMIN 3
(2016), http://trade.gov/topmarkets/pdf/Pharmaceuticals_Executive_Summary
.pdf.
24
What Are Generic Drugs?, U.S. FDA (June 19, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
ResourcesForYou/Consumers/BuyingUsingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGeneric
Drugs/ucm144456.htm.
25
H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2 at 7 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2691.
26
FDA, supra note 18.
27
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2006).
28
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(v).
29
§ 355(j)(2)(A)(viii).
30
21 C.F.R. § 211.1 (2016).
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upon by the product up for approval.31
Congress delegates full power to approve drugs for safety
purposes to the FDA. However, once drugs enter the marketplace, the
FDA has almost no role in evaluating alleged regulatory gaming
practices “because it explicitly avoids consideration of competition
effects when approving pharmaceutical products.”32 Therefore, due to
a lack of FDA oversight, the Hatch-Waxman system is ripe for
manipulation.
Paragraph IV certifications under the Hatch-Waxman Act allow a
generic company to enter the market before the patent of a brand
name drug expires if the generic challenger can “declare that its
product does not infringe the relevant patents or that the relevant
patents are invalid.”33 Generics have found it worthwhile to challenge
patents “because the first generic to file its application can obtain 180
days of marketing exclusivity during which it is the only generic on the
market.”34 However, by using the paragraph IV certification in the
ANDA, the submission is technically “an infringing act if the generic
product is intended to be marketed before expiration of the patent,”
and the generic ANDA has opened itself up to patent infringement
litigation.35 Many of these suits result in reverse payment settlements,
which are discussed in more depth below.

31

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii) (2006). The FDA also provides that:
A certification under paragraph I or II permits the ANDA to be approved
immediately, if it is otherwise eligible. A certification under paragraph
III indicates that the ANDA may be approved on the patent expiration
date. A paragraph IV certification begins a process in which the question
of whether the listed patent is valid or will be infringed by the proposed
generic product may be answered by the courts prior to the expiration
of the patent. . . . The statute provides that the first applicant to file a
substantially complete ANDA containing a paragraph IV certification to
a listed patent will be eligible for a 180-day period of exclusivity.
Gary Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Regulatory Pathway: Abbreviated New Drug
Application, FDA (Jan. 9, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Centers
Offices/CDER/ucm118356.pdf.
32
Brief for Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Professors as Amici Curiae at
10–11, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50026, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015); see also aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296
F.3d 227, 241 (4th Cir. 2002) (describing the FDA’s approach to Hatch-Waxman as
“focus[ing] on its primary task of ensuring that drugs are safe and effective” while
letting private parties sort out their respective rights).
33
FTC, supra note 2; see also Kesselheim & Darrow, supra note 19, at 302–03.
34
Id.
35
Small Business Assistance: 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity, U.S. FDA (Feb. 11,
2016),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/SmallBusinessAssistance/
ucm069964.htm.
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Upon receiving FDA approval, a company can begin to market its
product.36 Brand name drugs traditionally hire a large sales force and
have enormous marketing and advertising budgets.37 By contrast,
because generics are permitted (and one could argue actually
encouraged, based on Congress’s rationale for enacting HatchWaxman) “to piggy-back on the pioneer’s approval efforts,” they are
able to more quickly enter the market and stimulate competition.38 By
removing the cost barriers associated with R&D and marketing,
thereby lowering the price of drugs, the Act makes generics a viable
and attractive alternative to brand name drugs.39 The Act saved
consumers approximately $239 billion in 2013 alone thanks to
increased generic competition.40
B. The Uniqueness of the Pharmaceutical Market
The Hatch-Waxman Act was partially a response to the realization
that the pharmaceutical market is unlike any other. Put simply, the
pharmaceutical market is not efficient.41 A healthcare professional
prescribing a drug has no incentive to be concerned with price because
she is not paying for it and the cost of a drug in no way affects how she
is compensated.42
Traditionally, physicians will prescribe the
blockbuster drug that was marketed to them, thereby promoting the
brand name drug’s market dominance.43 Patients lack the expertise to
know which drug will best meet their needs, so they rely on their
healthcare professionals to act according to their best interest.44 While
patients can approach their prescribers about drugs they saw in directto-consumer advertising, it is ultimately the healthcare professional’s
decision as to what drug is prescribed. Often it is the third-party
36

Royall et al., supra note 16, at 72.
Id.
38
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 646 (2d Cir. 2015)
(citing FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2228 (2013)), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581
(2015).
39
Brief for Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Professors as Amici Curiae,
supra note 32; see H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(II), pt. 1, p. 4 (1984) (stating that Congress
enacted Hatch-Waxman to allow generics to compete via “following on” branded drugs
because other paths to get generics to market are not cost-effective).
40
Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant at 7 n.8,
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
50026, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015).
41
New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646.
42
Id.; see also F.T.C., BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, GENERIC SUBSTITUTION AND
PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICES: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF STATE DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION
LAWS (1985).
43
F.T.C., supra note 42.
44
New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646; see also F.T.C., supra note 42.
37
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payors, such as Medicare, Medicaid, or private insurers that directly
experience the high cost of brand name drugs, as opposed to patients
or healthcare professionals who are the ones selecting which product
to use; it is this disconnect which makes the pharmaceutical market
inefficient.45
C. An Effort to Combat the Inefficient Market: State Substitution Laws
“A generic drug is identical–or bioequivalent–to a brand name
drug in dosage form, safety, strength, route of administration, quality,
performance characteristics and intended use.”46 State substitution
laws, otherwise known as drug product selection (DPS) laws, are
adopted on a state-by-state basis with the goal of lowering drug prices
by substituting cheaper versions of the brand name drugs prescribed
by healthcare professionals.47 DPS laws require or allow a pharmacist
“to substitute generic versions of brand-name prescriptions” without
direction from the prescribing physician.48 All fifty states have such
laws in place.49 DPS laws in thirty states require that the generic version
have the same AB-rating as the brand name drug for which it is being
substituted.50 An AB-rating requires that a generic be the bioequivalent
and pharmaceutical equivalent of the brand drug.51 While twelve states
affirmatively “require pharmacists to substitute generic drugs, unless the
physician prescribes otherwise,” thirty-nine states allow the substitution
so long as there is AB equivalence.52 New York, for example, requires
pharmacists to “substitute a less expensive drug product containing the
same active ingredients, dosage form and strength as the drug product
prescribed” so long as the drug is on the list of generics approved by
the state.53 Twenty states have “therapeutic substitution” rules, which
allow a generic (including a non-AB rated generic) to be substituted
45

New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646.
FDA, supra note 24.
47
F.T.C., supra note 42.
48
Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The Missing
Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2010).
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1018.
51
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 645 (2d Cir. 2015)
(“meaning it has the same active ingredient, dosage form, strength, and route of
administration as the brand drug”), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015); see also U.S.
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FDA, APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS vii-ix (37th ed. 2016), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf.
52
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50026, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (emphasis added).
53
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6816-a (Consol. 2015).
46

OTT (DO NOT DELETE)

856

5/2/2017 1:11 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:849

for a brand name drug at the pharmacist’s discretion.54
DPS laws attempt to correct the inefficiencies in the
pharmaceutical market by shifting the power from prescribing
healthcare professionals to pharmacists.55 Pharmacists are incentivized
to substitute less expensive drugs “because the retail dollar gross
margin on the generic is higher.”56 Some of the savings from cheaper
drugs are passed on to patients, particularly those paying out of
pocket.57 Generic companies, insurers, and pharmacists who may
benefit from the sale of, or savings from, generic substitution rely on
state substitution laws to get generics into the hands of patients.58
Consequently, substitution laws have a dramatic effect on how
prescriptions are dispensed, particularly when applied to product
hopping, which will be discussed infra Parts II.B-IV.59
D. The Sherman Act and the Importance of Defining the Relevant
Market
The FDA’s primary role is evaluating the safety and efficacy of
drugs; it is not tasked with playing a role in the monitoring of the
competitive conduct of pharmaceutical companies. The Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), however, has a mission “[t]o prevent
business practices that are anticompetitive or deceptive or unfair to
consumers; to enhance informed consumer choice and public
understanding of the competitive process; and to accomplish this
without unduly burdening legitimate business activity.”60 The FTC
took a special interest in the health care market and formed a
dedicated health care division within the Bureau of Competition in the
1970s.61 “Through vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws, the FTC
54

Defendant’s Opposition to Summary Judgment at 30, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v.
Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026 (E.D. Pa. Apr.
16, 2015).
55
F.T.C., supra note 42, at 1.
56
Id. at 7.
57
Id. at 35.
58
See, e.g., Brief for Federal Trade Commission, supra note 40, at 5 (internal
citation omitted) (“[R]etail pharmacies have financial incentives to make efficient
generic substitutions and because they compete with other pharmacies on price
because they earn greater profits on generics than brand-name drugs.”).
59
See discussion infra Section III.B.2.
60
About the FTC, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc (last
visited Feb. 26, 2017).
61
Markus H. Meier, Bradley S. Albert & Saralisa C. Brau, Health Care Division,
Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission, Overview of FTC Antitrust Actions
in Pharmaceutical Products and Distribution, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (January 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/competition-policyguidance/overview_pharma_january_2017.pdf.

OTT (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

5/2/2017 1:11 PM

COMMENT

857

has taken an active role in ensuring that consumers benefit from
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.”62
A recent Second Circuit decision, citing a landmark United States
Supreme Court case, held that antitrust analysis is applicable to
anticompetitive activities in the Hatch-Waxman context.63 FTC v.
Actavis “specifically upheld antitrust applicability to the
pharmaceutical industry, even where the alleged ‘anticompetitive
effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent.’”64 That case looked specifically at Section 2 of the Sherman
Act.
“Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it an offense to ‘monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States.’”65 In order to be guilty of a violation, the
plaintiff must demonstrate “that the defendant possessed monopoly
power in the relevant market” and “that it willfully acquired or
maintained that power.”66 Before a violation can be found, therefore,
the court must identify the monopoly power and the relevant market.
This is a fact-sensitive inquiry.67
The definition of the relevant market varies by each type of case.
Therefore, the unique quality of the pharmaceutical market (i.e. the
disconnect between prescribers and payors68) is an important
component in the analysis.69 Determining the relevant market is often
the decisive issue.70
There are a number of different ways Section 2 has been litigated
in the pharmaceutical context. When drug company mergers are
62

Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
(July 2002), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/genericdrug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf.
63
Brief for Intellectual Property and Antitrust Law Professors as Amici Curiae,
supra note 32, at 8.
64
Id. at 10 (citing FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013)) (holding that
reverse-payment settlements under the Hatch-Waxman “drug-regulatory framework”
engineered to delay generic entry may violate the Sherman Act).
65
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 651 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
66
Id. (citing Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966))).
67
M. Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 71
ANTIRUST L.J. 633, 656 (2003).
68
New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 646.
69
Brief Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 40, at 16 (quoting Verizon
Commc’ns Inc., 540 U.S. at 411) (“Antitrust inquiries ‘must always be attuned to the
particular structure and circumstances of the industry at issue.’”).
70
Morse, supra note 67, at 652.
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challenged, for example, the market will be determined by criteria
such as the: (1) drugs for a specific condition or disease, (2)
mechanism of action, and (3) specific compound.71 These three
classifications resemble how drug classes are designated. “A drug class
is a group of drugs that have something in common” such as a similar
purpose, mechanism, or chemical structure.72 When the FTC
challenges reverse payment settlements, however, the relevant market
is usually more limited—it is restricted to the brand name drug and its
generic equivalents.73 While one Third Circuit judge claims that singleproduct markets are rarely defined because by default the
manufacturer will have a monopoly power,74 other courts have been
more willing to define the market narrowly (i.e. as a specific drug and
its fellow AB-rated generics).75
III. THE EVOLUTION OF REGULATORY GAMING PRACTICES
Because of the large costs involved in the research and
development of blockbuster drugs, brand name drug manufacturers
seek to maximize their profits and maintain patent exclusivity for as
long as possible.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that brand
pharmaceutical manufacturers have used creative practices in an
attempt to extend their market dominance. While drug companies
have used numerous methods to manipulate the patent and drug
approval system,76 two practices in particular have received a great deal
of attention and will serve as the focus of this Comment.
A. Reverse Payment Settlements
The FTC targeted reverse payment settlements (also known as
pay-for-delay settlements) because of their dangerous anticompetitive
effects.77 Brand name patent holders frequently challenge ANDAs
filed by generic drug manufacturers.78 Because the Hatch-Waxman Act
prevents competing generics from entering the market for six months
71

Id. at 650.
Drug Names and Classes, PUBMED HEALTH (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pubmedhealth/drug-names-and-classes/.
73
Morse, supra note 67.
74
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *23 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015).
75
See, e.g., New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 638 (2d
Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015); In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine
Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
76
Including authorized generics, rebate cards, patient assistance programs, etc.
77
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).
78
Id. at 2227.
72
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after the first-filer’s entry, brand pharmaceuticals will pay a premium
(in the form of a settlement) to prevent the first-filer from entering
the market before its patent expires.79 Patent exclusivity is so lucrative
for brand name companies that it justifies paying millions of dollars to
settle with generic competitors in order to preserve the monopoly as
they approach the patent cliff.80 This maneuver has the benefit of
preventing all generic drugs from entering the market because no
company can begin competing until six months after the first-filer’s
entry, which de facto always has to be after the settlement ends.81 Payfor-delay settlements allow brand name manufacturers to stockpile
profits for longer than Hatch-Waxman anticipated by controlling when
generic competitors can enter the market.82
The exclusivity period is significant in light of DPS laws because
during the 180-day exclusivity period, patients picking up their drugs
from pharmacies will likely be switched from a brand name drug to a
generic. Since essentially only AB-rated generics can be substituted,
the bulk of the population taking the brand name drug will receive
and begin using the exclusive generic on the market. Additionally, the
initial generic manufacturer can keep its price relatively high in the
absence of generic competitors who could stimulate lower prices.83
The FTC began intervening in pay-for-delay settlements in 2001
when it realized that pharmaceutical manufacturers were “exploiting
the statutory and regulatory scheme by reaching agreements to delay
the introduction of generic drugs to the market.”84 Between 2004 and
79

Id.
Id. The patent cliff is the sharp drop in sales resulting from the loss of patent
protection. Carrier, supra note 48, at 1014.
81
Carrier, supra note 48, at 1014. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006).
82
Under Paragraph IV certification, a generic competitor can challenge a brand
name manufacturer’s patent. If the brand patent is held to be invalid, the generic
competitor is permitted to begin marketing its product immediately (assuming it
meets the necessary ANDA requirements), which would promote competition and
thereby bring down drug prices, which is the goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act. Pay-fordelay settlements, however, give the power to the brand name company to determine
when generics will enter by paying generic competitors to stay out of the market until
a specified date, despite a potentially invalid patent, which if litigated and found to be
invalid would allow the generic competitor to enter immediately. F.T.C., PAY-FORDELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS (2010),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drugcompany-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staffstudy/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
83
MARTIN A. VOET, THE GENERIC CHALLENGE: UNDERSTANDING PATENTS, FDA AND
PHARMACEUTICAL LIFE-CYCLE MANAGEMENT 118 (Brown Walker Press 4th ed. 2014). See
discussion infra Section IV.D.
84
Pay for Delay, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergerscompetition/pay-delay (last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
80

OTT (DO NOT DELETE)

860

5/2/2017 1:11 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:849

2014, there were 215 potential pay for delay settlements between brand
and generic manufacturers.85 The FTC estimates that these settlements
add $3.5 billion to drug costs each year.86
Prior to the landmark FTC v. Actavis decision, there was a circuit
split regarding the appropriate standard for analyzing pay for delay
settlements. The Third Circuit applied the “quick look” test under
which any payment from a brand name patent holder to the generic
competitor is presumptively unlawful.87 The Second, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits applied the “scope of the patent” test in which the court
would determine whether a settlement “alleged that the challenged
agreements excluded competition to a greater extent than would the
patent.”88 This approach favored settling disputes that could be
complicated and expensive to litigate.89
Then in FTC v. Actavis, the Supreme Court held that the rule of
reason test applies in reverse settlement cases.90 The majority noted
that an evaluation of anticompetitive effects may be undertaken
without examining a patent’s validity.91 Justice Roberts dissented,
arguing that the scope of the patent test should have been applied.92
While a bright line rule was not created, the majority articulated five
considerations for concluding that “reverse payment settlements . . .
can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.”93 The factors to consider
include whether: (1) there was a payment; (2) there was a “reverse”
payment (i.e. payment from the alleged brand patent holder to the
85

Agreements Filed with the Federal Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Overview of Agreements Filed in FY 2014:
A Report by the Bureau of Competition, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMMISSION
Ex. 1 (Jan. 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/agreementsfilled-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drugimprovement/160113mmafy14rpt.pdf.
86
Pay for Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to Compete, U.S. FDA, https://www
.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/pay-delay (last visited
Feb. 27, 2017).
87
In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142206, at
*57 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014).
88
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (2013).
89
Id. at 2234.
90
Id. at 2237 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759 (1999)) (Noting
that the exception is for situations where “an observer with even a rudimentary
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would
have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets”); Whitney E. Street & Leigh
E. O’Neil, What Lies Ahead in High Stakes Pay-For-Delay Litigation, BUS. TORTS NEWSL.
(Spring 2015), https://www.justice.org/sections/newsletters/articles/what-lies-ahead
-high-stakes-pay-delay-litigation#_ednref3.
91
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2237.
92
Id. at 2238 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
93
Id. at 2225
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alleged generic patent infringer); (3) the payment was “large” which
the Supreme Court considers a “surrogate for a patent’s weakness” and
a “strong indicator of power—namely, the power to charge prices
higher than the competitive level”; (4) the large reverse payment was
“unexplained,” meaning not solely for the cost of litigation, payments
for other services, or “any other convincing justification”; and (5) the
parties may still settle in alternative ways, such as “allowing the generic
manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market before the patent expires
without the patentee’s paying the challenger to stay out prior to that
point.”94 The Commissioner of the FTC said that the Commission will
continue to protect consumers from anticompetitive drug settlements
that result in higher drug costs.95
B. Product Hopping
Another relatively new regulatory gaming practice is product
hopping. Product hopping occurs when a “branded manufacturer has
gamed or manipulated the FDA’s regulatory scheme by
opportunistically shifting resources to a new FDA-approved drug
formulation, while, at the same time, withdrawing support for the prior
formulation that faces imminent competition from generics.”96
There are two predominant forms of product hopping: a soft
switch and a hard switch. In a soft switch, a branded pharmaceutical
company ceases to market a drug whose patent is about to expire and
endeavors to convert patients/prescribers to its newer drug that treats
the same disease or symptoms.97 The company tends to heavily market
and discount the new drug in order to entice physicians and patients
to make the switch.98 This practice is considered merely persuasive
because it never removes a drug approaching the patent cliff from the
market, so it remains readily available for doctors to prescribe and
patients to use.99 While drug companies are clearly making an effort
to push customers toward its newest (and therefore most expensive
product), the choice remains with the healthcare professional as to
which of the available options she wishes to prescribe.
94

Id. at 2236–37.
Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC v. Actavis and the Future of
Reverse Payment Cases, Remarks at the Concurrences Journal Annual Dinner (Sept. 26,
2013) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_statements/ftc-v.actavis-future-reverse-payment-cases/130926actavis.pdf).
96
Royall et al., supra note 16, at 71.
97
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 648 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
98
Id. at 654.
99
Id. at 642.
95
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This behavior can eliminate or severely stunt Congress’s intended
introduction of low cost generic alternatives upon the expiration of the
brand drug’s patent as articulated in the Hatch-Waxman Act.100 Those
that oppose product hopping claim that it obliterates the market for
generic drugs by forcing the “generic essentially back to square one in
its efforts to deliver FDA-approved equivalents to the marketplace,”
since it will be unable to rely on DPS laws to bring its low-cost product
into the hands of patients.101 Brand name manufacturers, conversely,
claim to simply utilize the FDA and patent approval processes to get
innovative, new drugs approved and into the market.
In 2006, the District Court for the District of Columbia heard a
case in which generic companies alleged that AstraZeneca violated
Section 2 of the Sherman Act by switching consumers from
prescription Prilosec, which faced generic competition, to a virtually
identical drug, Nexium, which did not face generic competition
because it was protected by a valid patent.102 The District Court viewed
this conduct as a soft switch and held that the generic company
plaintiffs failed to identify any antitrust injury because Prilosec
remained an obtainable option.103 New or improved products should
not give rise to antitrust liability unless there is proactive
anticompetitive conduct amounting to coercion.104 Soft switches are
permissible because while the practice may be seen as persuasive, there
is no coercion—doctors are not impeded from freely prescribing the
drugs they believe are most appropriate for their patients.
Conversely, hard switches or forced switches are deemed coercive
and are subsequently prohibited.105 In hard switches, brand name
manufacturers are doing something more than merely introducing a
new drug into the marketplace—they are removing a previous version
of a brand drug from the market place and subsequently limiting
prescriber choice. 106 The court highlights the importance of
healthcare professionals’ and patients’ (i.e. the marketplace) freedom
100
101
102

Royall et al., supra note 16, at 71.
Id.
Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C.

2008).
103

Id. at 152.
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979).
105
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
106
Royall et al., supra note 16, at 72–73 (“[The] viability of product-hopping
antitrust claims turns largely on the strength of the facts, including whether the
branded manufacturer reinforced its switch to a new product formulation by
withdrawing the prior formulation from the marketplace and thereby arguably
limiting consumer choice.”).
104
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in deciding which drug is most appropriate via their decision to
purchase the reformulated or older version of a drug.107
When a brand name drug is removed from the market and
replaced by a newer, patent protected version, DPS laws are
inapplicable to substitute the generic developed for the initial brand
drug since there is no other AB-rated equivalent drug on the market.
Without being able to rely on pharmacists’ use of DPS laws to
introduce generics into the market, generics would need to actively
market their products to healthcare professionals and patients in order
to be competitive with brand name drugs.108 Generics are not typically
present in the minds of prescribers since generic companies do not
have the same marketing and promotion budgets as brand name
companies.109 Generics are also able to keep their prices low since they
do not have to conduct clinical trials under the ANDA process or
market their products thanks to DPS laws.110 Numerous judges have
indicated that forcing generics to advertise could increase the cost of
generic products.111 Furthermore, even if the investment in marketing
was undertaken, there is “no way to ensure that a pharmacist would
substitute [that specific company’s generic] product, rather than one
made by one of its generic competitors.”112
According to Professor Michael Carrier, reverse settlements can
have a tremendous effect when combined with the power of product
hopping. This lethal combination would “allow[ ] the brand firm to
methodically move to the new product at a time of its choosing”
without having to worry about DPS laws or generic substitution.113 The
FTC’s settlement with Warner Chilcott in 2006 is a useful case study.
In order to preserve competition for the sale of Ovcon, a widely used
birth control pill, Warner Chilcott entered into a pay-for-delay
agreement with Barr for $20 million in order to delay the generic
version’s market entry for five years.114 During this delay period,
Warner Chilcott planned a product hop from the older formulation of
107

Id.
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
See In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust
Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 683–84 (E.D. Pa. 2014); Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 408, 423 (D. Del. 2006).
112
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638, 655–56 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
113
Carrier, supra note 48, at 1034.
114
Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumers Win as FTC Action Results in
Generic Ovcon Launch (Oct. 23, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2006/10/consumers-win-ftc-action-results-generic-ovcon-launch.
108
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Ovcon to a new chewable version that had received a new patent.115
Additionally, Warner Chilcott would cease to sell the older formulation
of Ovcon in an effort to shift its market to the new, patent-protected
chewable formulation of the drug.116 This plan would have basically
prevented any generic competition because DPS law would no longer
trigger substitution of the older formulation of Ovcon, the new
chewable version would have patent protection from competitors, and
generic manufacturers would not yet have had the time to create a new
generic product of the same bioequivalence as the name brand drug.117
The FTC threatened to pursue a preliminary injunction that
would force Warner Chilcott to continue manufacturing the older
version of Ovcon, despite its looming patent cliff.118 Subsequently,
Warner Chilcott waived the provision in its agreement with Barr that
would have delayed the entry of the generic, and Barr began selling
the generic.119 While this settlement may properly be classified as payfor-delay, one could logically assume that if Warner Chilcott
successfully executed the hard switch during the generic delay,
patients and physicians would have been less likely to switch to generics
after the fact. Combining these two practices could have a substantial
negative impact on the cost of drugs.
IV. PRODUCT HOPPING CASES: DECISIONS VARY BY THE DRUG AT ISSUE
While the same rule of reason framework is used to evaluate the
actions of brand name pharmaceuticals in each product hopping case,
the way the test is applied and the resulting analysis varies by court.
The rule of reason balancing test is applied to weigh the asserted
procompetitive benefits of the product improvement against the
alleged anticompetitive effects.120 Procompetitive benefits always
include product innovation and improvement, while anticompetitive
effects include a lack of competition resulting in higher drug prices.
How can product innovation be analyzed? One method may seek to
avoid any potential chilling effects on brand name manufacturers’
investment in R&D. Another may be concerned with the level of
improvement or innovation between drug “hops.”121 In some cases, the
115

Id.
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Royall et al., supra note 16, at 72 (referring to United States v. Microsoft Corp.,
253 F.3d 34, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)).
121
Earlier product redesign cases dealt with questions of improved product
benefits. See, e.g., Cal. Computer Prods., Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d 727,
116
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improvements appear minimal (e.g. a trivial change from a capsule to
tablet), but in other cases (e.g. switching to extended release formula),
the improvements can be significant for patients in terms of
adherence.122 The calculus differs according to the judge, drug, and
relevant market definition. Defining the relevant market as broad or
narrow under the Sherman Act analysis is likely to be dispositive.
A. The Second Circuit: Hard Switches Are Impermissible
Traditionally, antitrust challenges have come from the FTC,123
generic competitors,124 or retail pharmacies.125 However, in New York v.
Actavis, Attorney General Eric. G. Schneiderman brought suit on
behalf of the State of New York in order “to protect . . . residents from
exploitative, anticompetitive business practices.”126
The issue
presented a case of first impression for the Second Circuit: whether
Actavis’s decision to engage in product hopping from an older
formulation of an Alzheimer’s drug to a new, patent protected version
violates the Sherman Act.127
744 (9th Cir. 1979) (IBM “was under no duty to help . . . other peripheral equipment
manufacturers survive or expand” and “IBM need not . . . have constricted its product
development so as to facilitate sales of rival products”); Allied Orthopedic Appliances
Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., 592 F.3d 991, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010) (“To weigh the
benefits of an improved product design against the resulting injuries to competitors is
not just unwise, it is unadministrable. There are no criteria that courts can use to
calculate the ‘right’ amount of innovation, which would maximize social gains and
minimize competitive injury.”). Contra United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34,
65 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that Microsoft redesign was anticompetitive because
there were no commercial justifications other than exclusion of rival products).
122
Ernest R. Berndt et al., The Impact of Incremental Innovation in Biopharmaceuticals,
24 PHARMAECONOMICS 69, 71 (2006) (“[I]nnovation that takes the form of improved
formulations, delivery methods and dosing protocols may also generate substantial
benefits associated with improved patient compliance, greater efficacy as a result of
improved pharmacokinetics, reduced adverse effects or the ability to effectively treat
new patient populations.”); Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, U.S. Fed. Trade Comm’n &
Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comments on the Canadian Competition Bureau’s Draft
Updated Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines 2 (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/734661/150810ca
nadacomment.pdf.
123
See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Consumers Win as FTC Action Results
in Generic Ovcon Launch (Oct. 23, 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2006/10/consumers-win-ftc-action-results-generic-ovcon-launch.
124
See Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *47 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015).
125
Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharm. L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146, 146 (D.D.C.
2008).
126
Complaint at 5, New York v. Actavis PLC, No. 14 Civ. 7374, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
172918 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2014).
127
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 643 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
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New York alleged that Actavis would unfairly profit from
vulnerable Alzheimer’s patients “by interfering with patients’ and
doctors’ abilities to choose the course of treatment that they feel is
most appropriate and cost-effective.”128 New York sought a preliminary
injunction to prevent Actavis from limiting access to an outdated
version of the Alzheimer’s drug, which would have the effect of
limiting the generic version’s market entry.129 The District Court
granted New York’s prayer for relief.130
In its Sherman Act analysis, the Court had to determine whether
Actavis had monopoly power in the relevant market and willfully
acquired or maintained that power. When examining the relevant
market, it is necessary to determine what class of drugs is involved.
Actavis created Namenda IR, which was approved to treat moderate to
severe Alzheimer’s in January 2004.131 The drug was formulated to
release immediately and therefore had to be administered to patients
twice-daily.132 Actavis later created Namenda XR, which was approved
in June 2010 and entered the market in 2013.133 Namenda XR is a slow
release drug and consequently only needs to be taken once-daily.134
Both Namenda IR and XR have “the same active ingredient and
therapeutic effect;” the most relevant change between the drugs is the
how often the prescription needs to be taken (i.e. twice a day versus
once a day).135 Importantly, these two Namenda products are the only
ones available in the memantine N-Methyl D-Aspartate (“NMDA”)
class.136 Therefore, there are no other bioequivalents that can be
substituted using DPS laws.
Some commentators have argued that the only plausible motive
for making a product change without an obvious improvement is to
prevent competition for longer than the twenty year patent allows.137
However, others contend that there is real value in innovative drugs
(e.g. creating an extended release/once a day drug for a population
suffering from memory loss, which is likely to increase adherence since

128

Complaint at 30, New York v. Actavis PLC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172918.
New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 643.
130
Id. at 649.
131
Id. at 646–47.
132
Id. at 647.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 647.
136
Id.
137
Brief Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 40, at 12 (internal citation
omitted).
129
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there are less opportunities to forget taking the medication).138
Regardless of the academic debate, the majority was unconcerned with
whether the drug was unique or innovative in New York v. Actavis.139
The court next looked to the intent of the drug company, which
arguably was to avoid the patent cliff and continue profiting on its
slightly reformulated brand name drug. Namenda IR’s patent was set
to expire on July 11, 2015.140 Five generic versions of Namenda IR were
set to enter the market at that time, while Namenda XR was protected
until 2029.141 Actavis, like many other companies that preceded it,
desired to avoid the patent cliff and ensuing losses.142 Therefore, two
years prior to Namenda IR’s patent expiration, Actavis stopped actively
marketing Namenda IR and focused its attention on Namenda XR.143
Both drugs were still available for physicians to prescribe and
pharmacists to dispense, making it a soft switch.144
However, after a few months Actavis decided to take more
extreme action after its “internal projections estimated that only 30%
of Namenda IR users would voluntarily switch” to Namenda XR before
Namenda IR reached the patent cliff.145 Actavis subsequently only
offered Namenda IR by mail-order pharmacy if it was medically
necessary; a population which was estimated to comprise only about
3% of current users.146
The District Court determined that removing Namenda IR from
the market before the generics entered would leave patients with no
option but to switch to Namenda XR, as it was the only other drug
available in that class to treat this stage of Alzheimer’s since generic IR
138

V. Nunes et al., Clinical Guidelines and Evidence Review for Medicines Adherence:
Involving Patients in Decisions About Prescribed Medicines and Supporting Adherence,
NATIONAL COLLABORATING CENTRE FOR PRIMARY CARE 209–10 (2009),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK55440/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK55440.pdf.
(The study found that making patients’ drug regimens easier to follow (e.g. reducing
the amount of pills that need to be taken) may be beneficial for increasing adherence,
“but the quality of evidence was low”).
139
The majority discusses superior product redesign in Berkey Photo, but fails to
apply that framework to the case at hand. New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 652–54.
140
Id. at 647.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 648 (Actavis “spent substantial sums of money promoting XR to doctors,
caregivers, patients, and pharmacists” and “sold XR at a discounted rate, making it
considerably less expensive than Namenda IR tablets, and issued rebates to health
plans to ensure that patients did not have to pay higher co-payments for XR than for
IR”).
144
New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 648.
145
Id.
146
Id.
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would not be therapeutically equivalent to Namenda XR according to
the FDA.147 Without being able to utilize DPS laws, which would
automatically trigger a switch to one of the generic versions of
Namenda IR, generics would essentially have no impact on the
Namenda market, because generic manufacturers typically rely on DPS
laws and do not market the drugs to healthcare professionals and
patients. The District Court deemed this an impermissible hard switch
and issued the state’s requested preliminary injunction requiring that
Namenda IR remain on the market until thirty days after the generic
versions of Namenda IR were released into the market.148
On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected the brand manufacturer’s
argument that the generic drug makers should be required to market
its version of the drug in order to compete with brand name
manufacturers.149 The court noted that in order “[f]or there to be an
antitrust violation, generics need not be barred from ‘all means of
distribution’ if they are ‘bar[red] . . . from the cost-efficient ones.’”150
The cost-efficient mechanism referred to is state drug substitution laws.
Some commentators have categorized this decision as effectively
creating a duty to aid a competitor, which generally is not required.151
Actavis filed a petition to the Supreme Court appealing the
Second Circuit’s decision.152 The issue challenged was “whether the
Sherman Act requires drugmakers to keep selling older drugs for the
benefit of state drug substitution laws and competitors’ profits . . . [and
whether] the Second Circuit erred by requiring the company to
‘maximize’ the sales of generic rivals by continuing to sell a medication
it considers outdated.”153 Actavis contended that there is no precedent
for instituting a duty to aid competitors.154 It further argued “that
antitrust law cannot be used to enforce other types of regulations and
that state laws should not determine how to apply a federal statute such

147

Id. at 649.
Id. at 649–50.
149
New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 656.
150
Id. at 656 (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64 (D.C. Cir.
2001)).
151
Refusal to Deal, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/refusal-deal
(last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
152
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis, 787 F.3d 638 (2d Cir. 2015), cert.
dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
153
Kevin Penton, High Court Urged To Weigh In On Drug ‘Product-Hopping’, Law360
(Nov. 6, 2015, 11:00 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/724581/high-courturged-to-weigh-in-on-drug-product-hopping.
154
Id.
148
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as the Sherman Act.”155 The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.156
It is unclear at this time whether the Supreme Court agrees with the
Second Circuit’s decision or if it is waiting for a circuit split, potentially
arising from an upcoming Third Circuit case discussed below.
B. The Third Circuit: Differing District Court Decisions Below
Two recent product hopping cases in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania reached opposite conclusions.157 They involved different
drugs for vastly different conditions, different size generic and brand
manufacturers, and were decided by different judges.
1. In re Suboxone Antitrust Litigation: In Agreement with the
Second Circuit
The plaintiffs in In re Suboxone are the direct purchasers and the
end payors of Suboxone.158 The defendant, Reckitt Benckiser, Inc.,
announced that it was removing Suboxone tablets from the market
several months prior to generic approval and did actually remove the
tablets from the market within a few weeks of generic entry.159
The District Court defined the relevant market as “a products’
reasonable interchangeability of use or cross-elasticity of demand
between the product and its substitutes.”160
Reasonable
interchangeability contemplates how similar two products are by
looking at price, use, and qualities.161 Cross-elasticity is a measure of
the change in demand caused by a price increase for similar goods
within the relevant product market.162 Suboxone is a product for
“maintenance treatment for patients suffering from opioid
addiction.”163 It is the sole drug currently on the market that can be
used by a patient in her home (as opposed to administration by a
healthcare professional in an office setting).164 The Court held that the

155

Id.
New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d at 638.
157
In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig.,
64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (holding that plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims
survived the motion to dismiss); Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co.,
No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (granting
Warner Chilcott’s motion for summary judgment).
158
In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 672.
159
Id. at 674.
160
Id. at 712 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)).
161
Id. at 712–13.
162
Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991).
163
In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 672–73.
164
Id.
156
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plaintiffs’ claim that the relevant market should be limited only to
Suboxone and its bioequivalents (i.e. only drugs that can be
substituted using DPS laws) was sufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss.165
Here, the narrow market definition combined with the hard
switch (i.e. the defendant’s removal of the older formulation of the
drug and the introduction of the newer formulation) was deemed
anticompetitive. The defendant’s product hop had the potential to
foreclose healthcare professional and patient autonomy by forcing a
switch.166 Furthermore, the court held that without other AB-rated
drugs on the market, drug substitution laws could not be used and
generic drug companies were unable to “efficiently compete” with the
brand name manufacturer of Suboxone.167 The plaintiffs’ Sherman
Act claims therefore survived the defendant’s motion to dismiss.168
2. Mylan v. Warner Chilcott: Stands in Contrast to the Second Circuit’s
Decision
The plaintiff in this case, Mylan, is “the third-largest generic
pharmaceutical company in the world,” with $6.13 billion in revenue
in 2011.169 The defendants are Mayne (only six products; $50.1 million
in sales) and Warner Chilcott (“$2.7 billion in revenue in 2011, 93%
of which came from eight products”).170 Both of the defendants, which
are brand name drug companies, are smaller than the plaintiff, which
is a generic manufacturer. Mylan argued that the defendants have
monopoly power under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.171 In order to
succeed, Mylan had to prove that Warner Chilcott did in fact have
monopoly power over the relevant market and that the company
willfully acquired or maintained that power.172
When determining the relevant market, courts look to the type of
drug at issue. Here “Doryx [is] the branded version of delayed-release

165

Id. at 713.
Jonathan H. Hatch & Robert P. LoBue, Court Allows “Product Hopping” Claims to
Proceed in Suboxone Litigation Based on Allegations of Removal of Prior Formulation and
Disparagement of Generic Competition, ANTITRUST UPDATE (Dec. 8, 2014),
http://www.antitrustupdateblog.com/blog/court-allows-product-hopping-claims-toproceed-in-suboxone-litigation/.
167
Id.
168
In re Suboxone, 64 F. Supp. 3d at 672.
169
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015).
170
Id.
171
Id.
172
Id.
166
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doxycycline hyclate, a prescription antibiotic used primarily to treat
severe acne.”173 At the District Court level, Judge Diamond noted that
dermatologists agree “that all oral tetracyclines treat acne with similar
effectiveness and so are interchangeable for that purpose” and further
that “Doryx is but one of a class of antibiotics used to treat acne.”174 For
example, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois lists various Doxycycline
products in the same preauthorization category as Minocycline
products.175 “Doxycycline in oral capsules, oral tablets, and oral
suspension and minocycline in oral capsules, oral tablets, and
extended-release tablets are available as AB-rated generics.”176 As
further evidence that the relevant market is broader than merely
Doxycycline, Mylan continually classified various tetracyclines in the
“Same/Similar” product category in internal analyses.177 The District
Court therefore determined that the relevant market included other
oral tetracyclines.178 Using a broad market definition, the defendants’
18% slice of the market was determined not to be predominant.179 This
market definition stands in stark contrast to the Actavis and In re
Suboxone cases where the market was limited to a single drug and its
bioequivalents.
When analyzing cross-elasticity in this case, the defendant’s
conduct was not symptomatic of a monopoly because “when
Defendants increased the price of Doryx, its sales decreased and the
sales of other oral tetracyclines increased.”180 This fact informs the
courts that other products were readily substituted for Doryx when its
price became unreasonable.181 While one particular company may be
harmed by alleged anticompetitive conduct, it has not been legally
injured as long as the broader market for the product has not been
harmed.182
173

Id. at *5.
Id. at *26.
175
Acne Antibiotics Prior Authorization Criteria, BLUE CROSS BLUE SHIELD ILL. 1 (Feb.
2011), http://www.bcbsil.com/pdf/pharmacy/rx_criteria/acne_antibiotics.pdf.
176
Id. at 4; see also Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations, U.S. FDA (Feb. 2016), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/
docs/temptn.cfm (Proprietary Name Search Results from ‘OB_Rx’ table for query on
‘Doxycycline’).
177
Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *27.
178
Id. at *30.
179
Id.
180
Id. at *28 (“Pay no more” cards to cut the price of drug as part of a marketing
effort).
181
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir.
2016).
182
Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *20 (citing Eichorn v. AT&T Corp., 248
174
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Warner Chilcott asserted “that antitrust law does not impose a
duty on brand firms to promote outdated formulations, such that
generic manufacturers may take advantage of automatic substitution
laws.”183 Unlike other product hopping cases that have cited Congress’s
intent to further the promotion of generic drugs, the District Court
did the exact opposite and took issue with generics “free-riding” on
brand name manufacturer’s investment in research and development
and marketing.184 Judge Diamond explained that the Hatch-Waxman
Act does not discuss product hopping and therefore Congress is
knowingly allowing the practice to continue.185 He believes that “The
Sherman Act protects competition, not competitors.”186 Therefore, the
“[d]efendants have no duty to facilitate Mylan’s business plan by
keeping older versions of branded Doryx on the market.”187 Amici
argued that requiring a brand name drug to continue manufacturing
an outdated version of the drug would increase costs for all
stakeholders, including the brand manufacturer that has to continue
to manufacture and ship the drug and pharmacies that need to house
and dispense the drug.188
Judge Diamond consequently granted Warner Chilcott’s motion
for summary judgment.189 In particular, Judge Diamond suggested that
Warner Chilcott had other avenues available to stay competitive with
brand manufacturers besides state generic substitution laws, such as
advertising and marketing.190 Again, this is in direct contrast with many
other judges, public officials, and scholars who claim that promoting
generics in such an expensive manner is unlikely to be effective since
F.3d 131, 140 (3d Cir. 2001)).
183
Vikram Iyengar, Mylan v. Warner Chilcott: A Study in Pharmaceutical Product
Hopping, 19 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 245, 261 (2015) (citing Memorandum of Law
in Support of Defendant Warner Chilcott’s Motion to Dismiss at 16, Mylan Pharms.,
Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *5–
6 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015) (“Plaintiffs argue that Defendants owed Mylan a duty to
continue marketing older versions of Doryx, so that Mylan’s generic Doryx could be
automatically substituted for Doryx prescriptions and Mylan would take the sale.”)).
184
Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *48.
185
Id. at *44.
186
Id. at *19 (internal citations omitted).
187
Id. at *40 (citing Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,
540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004) (discussing how there is no general duty to aid competitors)).
188
Brief for Business and Policy Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees
at 13, Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 50026 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015), http://cbpp.georgetown.edu/sites/cbpp
.georgetown.edu/files/Doryx%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf.
189
Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *5.
190
Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra
note 40, at 12.
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there is no guarantee that a pharmacist will dispense a particular
generic manufacturer’s specific product over another generic drug
since the resulting decrease in price and subsequent savings will result
regardless of which generic brand was substituted.191 The FTC believes
that if generic companies were forced to market their drugs in order
to stay competitive with brand manufacturers, the result would be
higher generic drug prices,192 which would undermine HatchWaxman’s intended purpose.
Perhaps Judge Diamond’s decision and analysis varied from the
aforementioned cases because in Mylan, the plaintiff was a much more
profitable enterprise than the defendants.193 Additionally, after the
defendant, Warner Chilcott, stopped producing 75 and 100 mg Doryx
tablets, Mylan became the only manufacturer of these dosages and
subsequently raised the prices to “higher than Defendants’ last
reported prices.”194 Mylan’s conduct seems to be squarely in contrast
with Congress’s intent to introduce generics as less expensive
alternatives. Judge Diamond’s decision may reflect the fact that the
generic manufacturer was more profitable and priced the generic
higher than the brand name drug.
On appeal to the Third Circuit, the FTC filed an amicus brief
claiming that the lower court erred in its decision because it believed
“that Doryx is therapeutically similar to other antibiotics.”195 The FTC
had previously advocated for a “quick look” standard that would allow
a court to hold a company liable without undertaking a nuanced
factual inquiry and the Supreme Court twice rejected it.196 The FTC
claims that the Eastern District of Pennsylvania “effectively embraces a
rule of nearly per se legality for product-hopping conduct.”197 The FTC
takes issue with the per se legality or scope of the patent standard
191

“[A]dditional expenditures by generics on marketing would be impractical and
ineffective because a generic manufacturer promoting a product would have no way
to ensure that a pharmacist would substitute its product, rather than one made by one
of its generic competitors.” New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d
638, 656 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
192
Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra
note 40, at 5.
193
Mylan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50026, at *20.
194
Id. at *14.
195
Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra
note 40, at 12.
196
See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999); FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
197
Brief for Federal Trade Commission Supporting Petitioner-Appellant, supra
note 40, at 21. This juxtaposes the FTC’s mission to protect the consumer if Mylan in
fact charged more than the brand name manufacturer.
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because it favors settlements in the face of potentially costly,
complicated litigation.198 The FTC likely believes that such a standard
would permit product hopping, thereby harming competition and the
public.
The Third Circuit, however, affirmed the lower court’s decision
against the wishes of the FTC. It refused to use Mylan’s narrow market
definition and instead agreed with the broader market definition used
by the District Court, which was comprised of other oral tetracyclines
prescribed to treat acne.199
Under the broad definition, the
defendants’ market share slice was not large enough to constitute
antitrust liability.200
The Third Circuit further agreed that the rule of reason was the
proper framework to use.201 While the Third Circuit did not specifically
use the words “uniqueness” or “improvements” when analyzing the
product hops, which the Second Circuit deemed irrelevant in the
Actavis case, the Third Circuit discussed the reasons for the new patent
application and said they were non-pretextual,202 implying the
motivation for the product hop was not solely to maintain its profits
from its original patent. Additionally, the Third Circuit noted that the
lower court held there was no duty to aid a competitor, but the Third
Circuit did not delve further into this issue in its analysis because it was
not like the Actavis case since there were already generic competitors
in the market.203 The Third Circuit distinguished the facts in this case
from those in the Second Circuit Actavis decision because there was no
patent cliff and 180-day generic exclusivity advantage at stake (which
would bar generic competitors from entering the market).204
The Third Circuit left open the possibility that “certain
insignificant design or formula changes, combined with other coercive
conduct, could present a closer call with respect to establishing liability
in future cases.”205 It enumerated a list of potential factors for future
courts to balance in such cases, using a fact-specific analysis.206 The
198

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2234.
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd. Co., 838 F.3d 421, 436–37 (3d
Cir. 2016).
200
Id.
201
Id. at 438.
202
Id. at 439.
203
Mylan, 838 F.3d 421 at 438.
204
Id. at 439–40.
205
Id. at 440.
206
Factors include:
balanc[ing] the important public interest in encouraging innovation in
the pharmaceutical industry with our obligations to protect consumers
199
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Third Circuit said courts must balance “the important public interest
in encouraging innovation in the pharmaceutical industry with our
obligations to protect consumers and to ensure fair competition under
the antitrust laws.”207 Additionally, courts must be “wary both of
second-guessing Congress’s legislative judgment and of turning courts
into tribunals over innovation sufficiency.”208 Lastly, courts need to be
aware of the unique divide between patients and pharmaceutical
manufacturers, “especially in cases where there is evidence of extreme
coercion of physician prescribing decisions or blatant
misrepresentation about a generic manufacturer’s version of a drug.”209
C. The Importance of Defining the Relevant Market and Why the Size of
the Market Varies Depending upon the Drug at Issue
One of the major differences in product hopping cases is the kind
of drugs involved. The seriousness of the disease and availability of
alternatives seems to have a dramatic effect on the outcome of the case.
Namenda, for example, is the only class of drugs exclusively approved
to treat moderate to severe Alzheimer’s.210 Alzheimer’s patients are
particularly vulnerable because they tend to be dependent on their
caretakers, as the disease makes people lost, confused, or forgetful, and
those afflicted require constant assistance with basic tasks and personal
care.211
Similarly, Suboxone is a drug for the maintenance treatment of
opioid dependence. It is a good treatment option for those recovering
from “short-acting opioids, like heroin or prescription painkillers.”212
It is the only drug of its kind that can be taken by the patient in her
own home; “all other opioid addiction maintenance treatments, such
and to ensure fair competition under the antitrust laws; . . . Congress’s
legislative judgment and of turning courts into tribunals over innovation
sufficiency; . . . [and the] unique separation between consumers and
drug manufacturers in the pharmaceutical market, especially in cases
where there is evidence of extreme coercion of physician prescribing
decisions or blatant misrepresentation about a generic manufacturer’s
version of a drug.
Id. at 440–41.
207
Id.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 440–41.
210
FDA-approved Treatments for Alzheimer’s, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N 3 (Feb. 2016),
http://www.alz.org/dementia/downloads/topicsheet_treatments.pdf.
211
Basics of Alzheimer’s Disease: What It Is and What You Can Do, ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N
15–16 (2015), http://www.alz.org/national/documents/brochure_basicsofalz_low.
pdf.
212
Treatment with Suboxone Film, SUBOXONE, http://www.suboxone.com/medicaltreatment (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).
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as methadone, can only be dispensed at a clinic.”213 There is great value
in a patient not having to travel to a physician’s office. For example, it
frees up the doctor’s schedule to treat other patients, and it allows for
a patient to gain independence and not have to travel to an office for
treatment. One can imagine the value to patients, their families, and
healthcare professionals in helping these patients fight their addiction
and regain a normal lifestyle.
In both cases, it is logical that a narrow market definition was used
considering the unique characteristics of the drugs at issue. In the
Mylan case, however, Doryx is one of many types of treatment for acne.
This case is distinguishable because the drug at issue was not the only
one approved for the specific indication. Here, dermatologists agreed
that all oral tetracyclines were interchangeable in treating severe
acne.214 Furthermore, unlike Alzheimer’s and opioid dependence,
acne is not a debilitating disease that affects family dynamics and
caregivers. Since acne can be more easily studied than Alzheimer’s or
addiction, a greater number of drug companies are able to create
products for acne treatment because the R&D costs are lower.
One of the issues that has emerged is whether there is a duty to
aid competitors. Generics “are largely at the mercy of their branded
competitors, whose continued support for the branded version of the
relevant drug is essentially a prerequisite for successful generic
entry.”215 Generic companies are undoubtedly successful because of
state substitution laws. The overwhelming majority of generic drugs
are dramatically lower in cost than brand name drugs.216 Generics do
not have to expend millions of dollars in R&D, marketing, and efforts
toward detailing healthcare professionals. However, if a brand
manufacturer strategically decides to remove an older formulation of
a drug, courts may force the brand name company to keep the older
formulation on the market until generics are able to successfully enter
the market and ideally stimulate competition and lower prices.217
Researchers suggest that it is only after four generic products are on
the market that the prices of generic drugs drop.218 Is the opposite true
213

In re Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride & Naloxone) Antitrust Litig.,
64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 673 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
214
Mylan, 838 F.3d 421 at 436.
215
Royall et al., supra note 16, at 71.
216
U.S. FDA, supra note 22 (“On average, the cost of a generic drug is 80 to 85
percent lower than the brand name product.”).
217
See, e.g., New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 650 (2d
Cir. 2015), cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
218
Suzanne McGee, Investigating the Mystery of Soaring Generic Medication Prices, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 11, 2015, 8:00 PM) http://www.theguardian.com/money/us-money-
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and generic prices increase as manufacturers leave the market?
In Mylan v. Warner Chilcott, Mylan became the only manufacturer
of a particular drug and it raised drug prices since there was no
competition to keep prices low, despite the fact that it was a generic
company and it is ordinarily presumed that generic prices are lower
than brand prices.219 Therefore, there is no guarantee that using drug
substitution laws to introduce more generic drugs into the market will
keep drugs prices low, particularly when generic companies are
strategically buying older generic drugs that have lost competition over
the years, freeing companies to raise prices.220 As additional support
for this notion, the National Community Pharmacist Association
undertook a study in which over “1,000 members [ ] reported instances
of generic drugs that had spiked by as much as 600%, 1000%, and even
2000%.”221 Over three quarters of the respondents reported twenty-six
or more instances of spikes in generic drug prices.222
What should be done in response? If Congress is aware of generic
manufacturers’ ability to reap such large profits, why are they choosing
not to amend legislation to alter their preference for generics? There
is a distinction between natural and forced monopolies. Natural
monopolies occur when generic companies leave the market
voluntarily after a number of years once the market is no longer
lucrative, which allows the remaining generic companies to raise their
prices due to a lack of competition. Forced monopolies arise when a
brand manufacturer attempts to preserve its profits in the form of
patent-extending strategies, which prevents potential generic
competitors from ever entering the market. The FTC is relatively
helpless to intervene when companies exploit monopolies that
developed naturally. 223 However, in light of the recent rise in generic
prices on older drugs facing a lack of competition (usually identified
by hedge fund managers seeking ways to maximize profits without
blog/2015/oct/11/generic-medication-prices-mystery (quoting Aaron Kesselheim).
219
Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Pub. Ltd., No. 12-3824, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50026, at *48 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 2015);
220
Former hedge fund manager Martin Shkreli raised the cost per pill of a drug
from $13 to $750. McGee, supra note 218.
221
Why Are Some Generic Drugs Skyrocketing in Price? Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Primary Health and Aging, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, U.S. HEALTH, EDUC.,
LAB. AND PENSIONS COMMITTEE 2 (2014), http://www.help.senate.gov/imo/media
/doc/Frankil.pdf (statement of Rob Frankil, Independent Pharmacist and Member of
the National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA)).
222
Id.
223
Elisabeth Rosenthal, Rapid Price Increases for Some Generic Drugs Catch Users by
Surprise, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/09/health/
some-generic-drug-prices-are-soaring.html.
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injecting funding into R&D), should these situations be treated the
same? To date, the FTC has not forced manufacturers who wish to
leave the market once it is no longer profitable to continue producing
a drug in order to keep generic prices low in natural monopolies. Yet
the FTC has in effect created a duty for brand name manufacturers to
aid competitors by requiring them to continue producing drugs that
are no longer profitable until generics can be introduced into the
market to stimulate competition.224 In both kinds of monopolies, the
goal is to maximize profits, yet they are treated differently. Companies
in both cases appear to lack beneficent intentions so perhaps they
should be treated similarly going forward.
While the FDA does not involve itself with questions of anticompetitive conduct, it made a beneficial step for healthcare
professionals, patients, and insurers, by announcing in March 2016
that it “will expedite a generic drug review if there’s only one
manufacturer.”225 FDA spokeswoman Sandy Walsh said this policy
change could push the review of about 125 generic drugs up in the
pipeline.226 However, the announcement falls short of being a total
solution to the generic price problem because the FDA will only
intervene if there is a potential drug shortage—not in the event of
price increases resulting from a monopoly.227 Despite the stated
purpose of the policy change, it will have the incidental effect of
controlling prices because there will be 125 fewer drug companies that
are able to inflate generic drug prices due to a lack of competition.
Understandably, competition is not the FDA’s domain,228 but it is the
only agency responsible for drug review, so this policy change is an
important move in the right direction.

224

I was unable to locate any instances in which the FTC filed a lawsuit or had
arranged a settlement requiring a drug manufacturer that wished to exit the market
to remain producing a drug in order to prevent a natural monopoly.
225
Anna Edney, Shkreli’s Strategy to Jack Up Drug Prices May Be Curbed by FDA,
BLOOMBERG BNA PHARMACEUTICAL L. & INDUSTRY REP. 405 (Mar. 14, 2016),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProduct
sandTobacco/CDER/ManualofPoliciesProcedures/UCM407849.pdf?source=govdeli
very&utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery (referring to Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research, Manual of Policies and Procedures, MAPP 5240.3 Rev. 2:
Office of Generic Drugs, Prioritization of the Review of Original ANDAs, Amendments, and
Supplements).
226
Edney, supra note 225, at 405.
227
Id.
228
That is up to the FTC, Department of Justice, or the Office of the Inspector
General.
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D. What Additional Measures Can Be Taken to Keep Generic Drug
Prices Low?
Comparative effectiveness research offers a potential vehicle for
savings, particularly in light of the rise of electronic health records229
and Congress’s support for the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research
Institute (PCORI).230 However, comparative effectiveness will require
many different stakeholders to come together to create a cohesive and
workable system.
Is Judge Diamond right that there are alternate ways to urge
patients and prescribers to choose a less expensive drug than through
DPS laws? Nudges like pre-authorization, approved drug lists from
insurance companies or pharmacy benefit managers, step programs,
and formularies are designed to facilitate the selection of cheaper
drugs.231 These tools force doctors and patients alike to make
conscious decisions about the drug being chosen and the ramifications
such decisions will have on prices.232 If these strategies do not result in
significant savings, we should ask why this is such a common practice
that impedes patients/insureds from receiving the treatment they
need in a timely fashion. It would then also seem to be a waste of
administrative time that will then actually make health care costs rise.
What remains unclear is whether these measures could result in
the cost savings that have historically resulted from the use of generics.
Can insurance companies and pharmacy benefit managers actively
implement measures that keep prices low? The answer is that without
the Hatch-Waxman Act creating the ANDA and public policy favoring
low-cost generics, probably not. The biggest issue moving forward is
what can further be done to limit costs, without inhibiting drug
innovation. The health care system is often fragmented for the sake of
administrative simplicity—regulating drugs, health plans, healthcare
professionals, and hospitals individually in order for information to be
palatable; as opposed to, for example, regulating drugs in such a way
that takes into account how high drug prices will lead to higher
insurance costs and therefore patient premiums. However, an

229

William R. Hersh et al., Recommendations for the Use of Operational EHR Data in
Comparative Effectiveness Research, EGEMS (Generating Evidence & Methods to improve
patient outcomes) 1 (Oct. 2013), http://repository.edm-forum.org/cgi/viewcontent
.cgi?article=1018&context=egems.
230
About Us, PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RES. INST. (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.
pcori.org/about-us.
231
New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 655 (2d Cir. 2015),
cert. dismissed, 136 S. Ct. 581 (2015).
232
Rosenthal, supra note 223.
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integrated system that looks at the health care system in its totality has
the potential to create innovative solutions to the problem of rising
health care costs.
V. CONCLUSION
The Hatch-Waxman Act took positive steps to introduce a greater
number of generic drugs into the market and subsequently lower
consumer and taxpayer costs. However, the evolution of regulatory
gaming practices, such as reverse payment settlements and product
hopping, demonstrate that the Hatch-Waxman system is far from
perfect. Like the health care system generally, the system for patents
and market exclusivity are complicated and ripe for manipulation.
The product hopping cases discussed illustrate the complexity of
considerations undertaken by courts when evaluating the legality of
such conduct including cost, patient choice, competition, type of drug
and disease at issue, and the relevant market. Even if product hopping
is eventually heard and resolved by the Supreme Court, the issue of
rising generic drug prices still exists and will need to be addressed. By
viewing the health care system as a single, interconnected system,
potential solutions involving different parties like pharmaceutical
manufacturers, health insurers, pharmacy benefit managers,
physicians, pharmacists, and patients could be created to limit the cost
of health care.

